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Abstract. Instances of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems failing to deliver consistent, 
satisfactory performance are legion. We investigate why AI failures occur. We address only a 
narrow subset of the broader field of AI Safety. We focus on AI failures on account of flaws in 
conceptualization, design and deployment. Other AI Safety issues like trade-offs between 
privacy and security or convenience, bad actors hacking into AI systems to create mayhem or 
bad actors deploying AI for purposes harmful to humanity and are out of scope of our 
discussion. We find that AI systems fail on account of omission and commission errors in the 
design of the AI system, as well as upon failure to develop an appropriate interpretation of 
input information. Moreover, even when there is no significant flaw in the AI software, an AI 
system may fail because the hardware is incapable of robust performance across environments. 
Finally an AI system is quite likely to fail in situations where, in effect, it is called upon to 
deliver moral judgments—a capability AI does not possess. We observe certain trade-offs in 
measures to mitigate a subset of AI failures and provide some recommendations. 
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________________________________________________________________________________ 
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems seek to employ computing machines to carry out tasks 
requiring reasoning, knowledge representation, planning, learning, natural language 
processing, and perception and tasks involving moving and manipulating objects [1]. In this 
study, we present causes of AI failure grouped under stylized headings and provide 
recommendations to address certain failure situations. It is hoped that the study will influence 
development of better AI systems, as well as encourage pursuit of non-AI solutions where fatal 
AI flaws cannot be avoided.  
1.0. Omission errors in the design of an AI system. This happens when the AI system is 
unable to draw on a pre-configured recourse to handle a situation it encounters under 
conditions of live operation.  One such instance of AI failure was observed in Las Vegas 
[2]. A driverless shuttle bus stopped but failed to sound the horn to alert the driver of a 
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delivery truck that was reversing on to a lane perpendicular to the bus’s path. Eventually 
the truck’s wheel clipped the fender of the shuttle.  
Another flavor of omission error originates in failure to design the AI system to cope 
appropriately with certain variations in a known scenario. For example, the "liveness" detection 
feature of iPhone’s Face ID—which is used to confirm the person Face ID is looking at is real 
and not a mask or someone wearing prosthetics—was defeated with glasses and tape [3]. 
Relatedly, it has been shown [4] that in Amazon’s Rekognition tool, photos of senators of color 
are more likely to be misidentified as matching with mugshots of persons arrested on suspicion 
of criminal conduct. It is probable that the ‘face template’ used in the Rekognition tool has a 
large number of parameters on which only non-colored people (e.g. white males) exhibit 
significant variation. Omission of parameters in which the colored people exhibit variation 
leads to course-grained judgments, resulting in higher extent of false positives. 
2.0. Commission errors in the design of an AI system. This happens when an AI system 
takes an inappropriate action on account of flawed design of the command-processing 
module of the AI system. One kind of commission error is manifested when the AI system 
incorrectly construes an environmental event as a command for action. The AI system ends 
up taking an action not requested by the end-user / owner. This error happens when a wake-
up or take-action command is not sharply distinguished from environmental events. In 
Portland, U.S.A., Amazon Echo listened to a couple’s conversation about hardwood floors 
and sent the recording to someone in their contact list—without the couple’s knowledge 
[5]. A variation of this commission error manifests when the AI system takes action when 
it is not asked to, and such happens when there are nil environmental cues to misconstrue. 
This is likely to happen when the logic in the AI system’s internal processing routines 
generates a wake-up or take-action command inappropriately. Moreover, on some 
occasions, the introduction of new features (or ‘updates’) breaks the robustness of existing 
features, in that the functioning of a new feature (or ‘update’) itself—and not environmental 
noise—inappropriately directs the AI system to take action. An instance of an AI system 
taking action without being asked to is observed in the case where Amazon Echo turned on 
music from Spotify at full volume, at an hour past midnight, in an empty sixth floor 
apartment in Germany [6]. 
3.0. AI failure arising from inappropriate interpretation of input information. This 
happens when an AI system takes inappropriate action upon failing to interpret input 
information correctly. Shortly after its release in 2011, Apple’s Siri agreed to memorize the 
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name of its owner as “an ambulance”, simply because the latter had issued a command 
“Siri, call me an ambulance.” [7] Siri failed to disambiguate between alternate uses of the 
phrase “call me”. In eastern China, a traffic camera using AI deemed that a driver was 
"driving while holding a phone”—an offence meriting a fine—when the corresponding 
picture clearly shows that the driver was just scratching his face [8]. 
4.0. AI fails because the hardware is incapable of robust performance across 
environments. The hardware of an AI system comprises not just the CPU, GPU and 
servers in the cloud, it also involves sensors including image capture devices like camera, 
devices to capture sound, temperature, humidity etc., and related wiring to the 
computational device(s) running AI software. The degree of robustness of functioning of 
the hardware and sensors feeding data to an AI system—under a range of environmental 
conditions pertaining to fluctuation of temperature, humidity, dust and suspended 
particulate matter, lighting, foreground and background noise, incidence of electric and 
magnetic waves—impact AI functioning even when there are no major flaws in the AI 
software. For instance, in Staten Island, New York, a ten-year-old boy was able to unlock 
his mother's iPhone X using his own face for Face ID verification, under certain lighting 
conditions in one of the family’s bedrooms [9]. The Boeing Max crashes (Lion Air Flight 
610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in March 2019) had an AI system 
(MCAS) dangerously bending the nose of the airplane downwards regardless of altitude—
in a misdirected bid to avoid stall as happens if the plane had its nose raised too far—based 
on reading from just one (angle-of-attack) sensor [10]. Erratic sensor outputs doomed the 
two fatal 737 Max crashes because it left the pilots fighting the control system and losing 
the battle, but the problem could have been either the sensor or in the wiring that connects 
the sensor to the flight computer and thence to the flight software and MCAS. One 
viewpoint is that if MCAS was not rushed through development, it could have taken input 
from other sensors as well, in order to arrive at a flight solution, such as from the plane’s 
artificial horizon, airspeed indicator, altitude data and other computer solutions on the flight 
profile. 
5.0. AI fails because it is unable to make moral judgments. This point addresses situations 
where providing more data, improved design and/or better hardware is not going to make 
problems in AI functioning go away. When an AI system encounters a novel situation for 
which pre-configured rules cannot be readily found or for which contradicting rules seem 
to apply, the AI system either fails to take action, or chooses randomly from the set of 
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actions feasible, or takes the first action it reads from its code, or repeats a previous action. 
Alternately, the AI system may take an action that addresses the first (or last) sub-set of 
conditions for which built-in processing routines exist. The response from the AI system is 
likely to be inappropriate in most cases. In contrast, humans are often able to use their moral 
judgment to determine appropriate actions in unanticipated situations. Morality takes root 
in humans through (a) conditioning since childhood and over generations, shifting as social 
mores shift, and (b) by observation and learning from the action of role models in various 
situations. Human decision-making is nuanced by virtue of richer input and richer 
repertoire of processes to interpret input and construct a response. A human receives 
information from many channels—sight, sound, smell, touch, taste, as well as by observing 
reactions of other humans—and draws from a wealth of prior experience. Humans are able 
impute meaning to actions and gestures of others, taking into account the context as well 
as the cultural setting. Human conversation and gestures convey much more than what is 
embodied when the words are codified into text and symbols. AI has access only to the 
codified texts and symbols. The design of an AI system admits to a less complex 
interlinking relationship among channels providing inputs. One and only one meaning is 
imputed to a particular signal or pattern of signals, by AI. The nature of clarifying questions 
asked by AI (to human end-users) is also rather primitive, compared to the nature of 
clarifying questions a human can ask another human, in order understand a situation better. 
AI cannot succeed in situations where only the human can draw from behavior, speech, 
actions and non-verbal cues arising in interactions with other humans, as well as where 
only the human can draw from prior socialization experiences and other contextual 
information and interpretations thereof. The following incident featuring Sophia  the 
humanoid robot is instructive: 
       In March of 2016, Sophia's creator, David Hanson of Hanson Robotics, asked Sophia during a live 
demonstration at the SXSW festival, "Do you want to destroy humans? ...Please say 'no.'" With a blank 
expression, Sophia responded, "OK. I will destroy humans." [11] 
       Sophia misinterpreted a request to provide her opinion about something as a request to 
agree to carry out the activity in question. Sophia interpreted the “Please” after Hanson’s 
question as a request to agree to do as “asked” in the previous sentence (i.e. agree to destroy 
humans), and failed to comprehend that the full sentence—“Please say ‘no’”—requested 
just the opposite. We note that Sophia did not directly answer whether she wants to destroy 
humans. Sophia’s response (“OK. I will …”) suggests she merely agreed to carry out a 
command given to her. In general AI shall find it difficult to resolve the clash between two 
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competing values (a) to always cooperate with the human owner and (b) to not harm 
humans. In contrast, humans are able to choose among two alternatives by moral reasoning, 
on most occasions. 
Debrief and Recommendations. Given the state of technology today, we feel that AI should 
not be deployed in frontline roles that require making moral judgements that drive rewards and 
punishment for humans (# 5.0. above). To address # 4.0., triangulation from multiple sources 
should be insisted upon, to bolster reliability of AI hardware. Moreover, there is need for an 
ongoing discussion in the society regarding the circumstances under which mass deployment 
of cheap low-capacity hardware (for instance low-resolution cameras)—that yield questionable 
evidence—is preferable over using human intelligence and situation-awareness. Further, in 
situations requiring disambiguation of human interactions—speech, symbols and behavior (# 
3.0. above)—we feel that trained human agents must be deployed complementing AI.  
In order to address omission errors where certain a pre-configured recourse to handle a 
situation is missing (# 1.0. above), we need to recognize an underlying trade-off. Take the case 
of driverless vehicles: Rides by driverless-vehicles will tend to be jerkier when the AI system 
pays attention to a greater number of “threats” and slams brakes to wait till a threat goes away; 
a smoother ride is possible only when a majority of threats are ignored by the AI system, but 
it may lead to serious accidents, as happened when an AI-driven Uber vehicle hit and killed a 
pedestrian [12]. The only reasonable solution appears to be to have driverless vehicles ply 
under the watch of engineers/ emergency drivers sitting inside the car for as long as it takes to 
develop confidence regarding safety. For other AI applications, the trade-off is between AI 
requesting inputs from the human owner annoyingly frequently, vs. the AI system failing to 
ask in critical cases. 
There is also a trade-off underlying the situation where variations of some known scenarios 
are missing (# 1.0. above): AI designers devote more time to think up variations, lengthening 
development time (while not escaping groupthink) vs. putting the AI solution “out there” to 
generate new variations, to be taken care of, subsequently. Here again, we feel that an AI 
system should not function un-chaperoned in applications that potentially involve 
unconscionable levels of risk to human safety, a case to point being the instance a worker was 
killed by a robot in a Volkswagen plant in Germany [13].  
In order to rectify the situation where an AI system responds to environmental cues instead 
of responding only to owner commands (# 2.0. above), further research on biometrics is needed 
to make the owner’s command unique, but not so unique as to lock the owner out from getting 
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response when his/her voice changes due to age, illness etc. Alternately, separating the owner 
and the command generation mechanism may help.  For example, the owner may initiate a 
sound of a certain frequency by a device, to wake up an AI-assistant. However, this option 
could be problematic if the device to make the wake-up sound falls in wrong hands. Further, 
much needs to be done to prevent AI from acting when owner-generated and environment-
generated cues are absent. A centralized control of the AI design and development process may 
help. But it will slow the pace of new releases, since every new release must be tested for 
potentially breaking all prior functionality. This gets complicated when AI systems interact 
with other third-party systems, for example, Echo connecting to Spotify. Unless rigid input-
output protocols are maintained, a new release of functionality of Echo may not be protected 
from every potential idiosyncratic behavior of Spotify and vice-versa. 
In sum, we observe that just as all contracts are incomplete1—or, alternately, just as no 
sample can represent a population fully—AI developers may fail to foresee all manner of 
contingencies that can arise in live operation. Alternately, a commercial imperative to get an 
AI solution out of the door as quickly as possible can also lead to problems arising from (a) 
insufficient number of scenarios being considered, and (b) certain variations of known 
scenarios getting missed out. We observe another compounding factor compromising AI 
development: thinking in silo-s. For example, in the case of the MCAS system indicted in the 
Boeing Max accidents, we are otherwise at a loss to explain that a reliability engineer did not 
object to tying the MCAS to just one sensor, and thereby the specification to consider having 
MCAS act on the basis of readings from multiple sensors never reached the AI development 
team. An alternate explanation—that for MCAS, single sensor reading was preferred over 
multiple sensor readings merely to reduce cost and/or delivery time—appears far-fetched given 
Boeing’s rich engineering heritage. Moreover, the design outcome that the MCAS system can 
wrest control of the plane from the human pilot and point the nose of the plane downwards 
even at low altitudes is equally inexplicable, unless we impute presence of unconscionable 
extent of silo-d thinking.  
Last but not the least, we see tremendous potential for developing Localized AI solutions 
—AI solutions that don’t require tethering to servers in the remote cloud—in the same way the 
desktop revolution provided an alternative to the dumb-Terminal-smart-Server paradigm 
dominant in an earlier era. At present a vast majority of the AI systems are designed to interact 
                                                             
1 We learn from the research of Grossman and Hart [14] that no contract between two parties—say between the 
AI developer and the AI end-user—can specify what is to be done in every possible contingency. 
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with the cloud. The primary purpose is to gather as much user and usage data as possible for a 
range of purposes, current and future, some noble, some not so. When we transcend the mind-
block of endeavoring to make every AI application tied to the cloud and see what can be done 
better, locally, a range of new AI applications come to the fore. For example, deep learning 
and allied technologies may be deployed to study how cells regenerate in humans, and tasked 
with re-growing a damaged organ. The alternative in use today—organ transplants—has low 
success rates and ties patients to medications for the rest of their lives. Likewise, AI-based 
learning may be deployed to extract a significant proportion of the suspended particulate matter 
(SPM) from mines and from the flue gas of thermal power-plants and oil rigs—perhaps 
converting the SPM into useful fertilizer or building material—lowering the incidence of 
respiratory diseases in the neighborhood. Further, the productive life of solar panels may be 
enhanced by deploying AI-based learning to clean cells in real-time, arresting the depletion of 
the height of the potential barrier, delaying the aging process of cells.  
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